










 Criteria of Lawfulness 
The detention of a person of 
unsound mind is regulated 
by Art. 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
which stipulates that detention must 
be ‘lawful’ and ‘in accordance with 
a procedure prescribed by law’. Th e 
case of Winterwerp v. Netherlands 
defi ned the term ‘lawful’ as meaning 
conformity with the requirements of 
national legislation and the restrictions 
established in Art. 5(1)(e).1 Winterwerp 
also diff erentiated between ‘procedural’ 
and ‘material’ lawfulness. Procedural 
‘lawfulness’ requires that detention be ‘in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law’. Material ‘lawfulness’ requires that 
the detainee is in fact of unsound mind 
and that grounds exist for confi ning him 
against his will. 
Winterwerp established a ‘triple-test 
approach’ to material ‘lawfulness’. Th is 
test was developed further in Johnson v 
UK :2 
 
1. A person must be acknowledged 
objectively as being of ‘unsound mind’. 
Although there was no easily defi nable 
defi nition, Winterwerp established that 
Art. 5(1)(e) ‘obviously’ cannot permit 
the detention of a person “simply 
because his views or behaviour deviate 
from the norms prevailing in a particular 
society”. Further, the only way to 
establish mental disorder is by “objective 
medical expertise”; only if there are 
convincing grounds, can the objectivity 
and reliability of medical evidence be 
doubted.3 In exceptional cases medical 
expertise may not be required, but only 
if a medical examination was carried out 
immediately after detention.4 
2. “Psychiatric deviations must be of 
such a character and such a degree as 
to warrant compulsory hospitalisation”. 
Psychological illness should not 
automatically lead to detention. Initially, 
national authorities have a discretion 
to evaluate the evidence in a particular 
case; the Court subsequently reviews 
those decisions under the Convention .5 
Th e Court in Litwa v. Poland held that 
detention was only justifi ed where less 
severe measures had been considered, 
but were insuffi cient to safeguard the 
individual or public interest.6 In other 
words, detention must be reasonable and 
absolutely necessary.7 
3. Th e justifi cation for continued 
detention depends on the duration of 
the illness. In Johnson the Court opined 
that “it does not automatically follow 
from a fi nding by an expert authority 
that the mental disorder which justifi ed 
a patient’s compulsory confi nement 
no longer persists, that the latter must 
be immediately and unconditionally 
released”. Th e Court also recognised 
that a responsible authority can exercise 
discretion to order the discharge of a 
person who is no longer suff ering from 
a mental disorder. Th e person authorised 
to carry out the detention must relocate 
the former patient in a post-discharge 
hostel, if he is being released under 
defi ned conditions.8 
Th e application of Article 5(1) is limited. 
Th e principle of lawfulness of detention 
applies to both the sanctioning and 
execution of the measures involving 
deprivation of liberty.9 Ashingdane 
recognised the relationship between 
sanctioning detention and place and 
conditions of detention. In principle, 
‘detention’ is only ‘lawful’ if eff ected in 
a hospital, clinic or other appropriate 
institution authorised for that 
purpose.10 
Procedural ‘lawfulness’ is only 
possible if there is compliance with 
the following rules. State law must be 
suffi ciently precise.11 For example, a 
violation was found in two Bulgarian 
cases because the national legislation did 
not contain any regulations providing 
public prosecutors with powers to 
detain people in psychiatric hospitals for 
psychiatric examination.12 Additionally, 
the person responsible for the detention 
must comply with domestic legislation. 
Rakevich provides one such example.13 
Supervision of detention of persons of 
unsound mind 
Art. 5(4) establishes that anyone subjected 
to arrest or detention is entitled to take 
proceedings to decide the lawfulness of 
the detention ‘speedily by a court’ and to 
be released if the detention is not lawful. 
At this stage it is important to briefl y 
address the “incorporation rule”,14 
insofar as this rule exists in Russian 
legislation.15 In Russia, supervision is 
already ‘incorporated’ in the compulsory 
hospitalisation decision, which creates a 
major peculiarity: “Where the decision 
depriving a person of his liberty is one 
taken by an administrative body,… Art. 
5(4) obliges the Contracting States to 
make available to the person detained a 
right of recourse to a court; but there is 
nothing to indicate that the same applies 
when the decision is made by a court 
at the close of judicial proceedings. In 
the latter case the supervision required 
by Art. 5(4) is incorporated in the 
decision.”16 
Th e incorporation rule has two legal 
consequences. Firstly, where a court 
decides to detain, the person of unsound 
mind does not have the right to have 
the lawfulness routinely reconsidered. 
Secondly, the rule signifi es a degree of 
overlap between the guarantees of Article 
5(4) requiring supervision, and Article 
5(1)(e), in accordance with procedures 
prescribed by law, which could include 
the court’s original decision to detain. 
Th e European Court’s case law 
answers three basic questions that arise 
when qualifying actions in accordance 
with Art. 5(4): 
1. What to supervise? Art. 5(4) does 
not grant a right to judicial review of 
such a scope that the court’s decision 
would substitute for the discretion of 
the decision-making body. Judicial 
review must, however, be suffi cient to 
assess the observance of those guarantees 
that are vital for establishing lawfulness 
in accordance with Art. 5(1).17 “Th e 
reviewing ‘court’ must assess the legality 
of the detention in the light of the 
Winterwerp criteria.”18 Th erefore, there 
must be the possibility of challenging the 
detention on procedural and material 
grounds. 
In exceptional circumstances, where 
compulsory hospitalisation is permitted 
before receipt of an expert medical 
report, the scope of the judicial review 
will be signifi cantly restricted, as the 
person responsible for the compulsory 
hospitalisation must possess wider 
powers of discretion.19 
2. Whom and how to supervise? In 
Art. 5(4) the term ‘court’ should not be 
understood as a judicial authority in its 
traditional meaning, established in the 
country’s judicial system. Any ‘court’ 
must have the authority to decide the 
lawfulness of the detention; it must be 
independent, and guarantee appropriate 
judicial procedures to settle disputes.20 
Th e European Court sanctions court 
procedure in accordance with Art. 5(4) 
which does not have to have the same 
procedural guarantees as provided for 
by Art. 6(1) for criminal or civil cases. 
Nevertheless, “[i]t must have a judicial 
character and provide guarantees 
appropriate to the kind of deprivation of 
liberty in question.”21 
Th e right to initiate one’s own 
proceedings to contest compulsory 
hospitalisation is a primary guarantee 
of Article 5(4). Th e right to judicial 
recourse, which is available only to a 
state authority (and not to the detainee) 
is not suffi cient for compliance with the 
guarantees of judicial review.22 
Th e principle of equality of arms23 
requires a number of guarantees: 
the applicant must have the right to 
participate in the court proceedings 
(in person or by a representative) 
and consequently must be properly 
informed of the forthcoming hearing.24 
Furthermore, in certain cases it will be 
necessary to grant the applicant the right 
to appear before the court at the same 
time as the prosecutor, so that the former 
has the opportunity to reply to the latter’s 
arguments.25 Th e lack of opportunity 
to argue verbally or in writing, in 
person or through a representative, and 
non-compliance with the right to full 
disclosure would breach Article 5(4).26 
3. When to supervise? Th e applicant is 
entitled to challenge the lawfulness of 
detention both initially and periodically 
as new facts arise. Judicial review is 
particularly important where initial 
reasons for confi nement cease to 
exist.27 
Th e phrase “urgent examination by 
the court” is refl ective of the general 
requirements of judicial proceedings 
conducted without undue haste, carefully 
considering all relevant details.28 In the 
event of the absence of these elements it 
is possible to establish breaches of Art. 
5(4). 
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